Colombia: The Importance of the Constitutional Judge in the Exceptional Exercise of Taxing Powers
- Carlos A. Fonseca Sarmiento
- Feb 27
- 1 min read
When Congress does not approve a tax reform, can the Executive impose it through a state of emergency?
That is precisely what happened in Colombia.
In December 2025, pursuant to Article 215 of the Constitution, the President issued Legislative Decree 1390, declaring a State of Economic and Social Emergency. By doing so, he assumed extraordinary legislative powers in fiscal matters.
Days later, Legislative Decree 1474 followed, imposing a 19% VAT on games of chance operated exclusively online, along with other fiscal measures that Congress had not approved.
A bold move that calls into question the historic principle of “no taxation without representation.”
Because states of exception are not a parallel avenue to reopen tax debates lost in the Legislature.
The Constitutional Court reacted. In exercising the automatic review provided under Article 241.7 of the Constitution, and expanding the scope of its precautionary powers, it provisionally suspended Decree 1390 through Order 082 of 2026 (Case RE-387), legally placing everything derived from it — including the VAT on online gaming — in limbo.
Beyond the specific tax measure, the institutional message runs deeper:
Emergency powers cannot become a legislative shortcut.
In presidential systems — typical across Latin America — the temptation is evident: to use exceptional powers to compensate for the lack of congressional majorities.
But constitutional design provides a counterweight:
When the Executive exercises exceptional taxing authority, the ultimate limit is imposed by constitutional judges.
And this time, the Court chose to enforce that limit.
The final decision has yet to come. But the precedent already sends a powerful signal:
Extraordinary taxing power is not a blank check.
